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Using Cameroon as a case study, this research examines if a legal system built primarily upon 
indigenous laws can serve modern economic, political, and social realities. Indigenous laws have 
several attractive advantages (such as expediency in dispute resolution, and fostering community 
cohesiveness), and may fully thrive in a homogenous society. However, after examining the realities in 
Cameroon, the study concludes that since the society has dozens of tribes with values and traditions 
which are invariably different, and because the country relies on foreign aid, what is advocated is a 
system whereby indigenous and formal laws co-exist. 
 





Many studies on informal social control have harped on 
the relative decorum and limited interpersonal conflicts in 
local settings in developing countries in comparison to 
the plethora of cases taken to formal courts in big cities 
(Time, 2000; Austin, 1987). Explanations for this 
perceived phenomenon have been given to include 
adherence and abidance to traditional mores 
(Okereafoezeke, 2002; Time, 2000; Austin 1995), 
informal restraints on criminality such as family (Time, 
2000; Austin, 1995, 1987), community cooperation and 
ostracism (Austin, 1984). More current research tends to 
focus on the settlement process used by local 
communities. This process is characterized by prompt 
response to the dispute, use of a neutral and perceptive 
mediator, and resolution by indemnification or restitution, 
and reconciliation. Restorative justice, as this process 
has come to be known is geared towards maintaining 
community cohesiveness and restoring the aggrieved 
party close to the position where he/she was prior to the 
dispute. These beneficial aspects of restorative justice 
are victim-centered and as proponents of restorative 
justice suggest litigants proclaim above average 
satisfaction with the process (Sherman and Strang, 
2007). Such satisfaction is credited to the face-to- face 
confrontation between victim and offender (Green, 2007), 
sensible and therapeutic benefits (Daly and Stubbs, 




Statement of the problem 
 
Even though restorative justice seems attractive, formal 
courts are scattered throughout the big towns and cities 
in developing countries.  Justice in formal courts is 
notoriously slow, expensive, and often dwells on 
stigmatizing the guilty person by creating a permanent 
criminal judicial record, and hardly opens up the 
possibility for reconciliation. Braithwaite (2005) has 
argued that formal criminal justice promotes an 
adversarial process over a communicative process, and 
that the looming existence of punishments stalls the 
effectiveness of formal judicial processes. Its drawbacks 
notwithstanding, formal courts have invariably handled 
matters beyond inter-personal relations, as for instance, 
political issues, corporate disputes, and other issues 
unique to modernization. These types of non-
interpersonal cases were not envisioned in 
customary/traditional law, and as some have contended, 
even contemporary legislators have not been able to 
foreshadow the myriad of crimes which time may unleash 
(Samaha, 2008, Hart and Sacks, 1994). Giving that 
strengths and downsides have been raised in both 
formats, Austin (1987), observed that in Philippines at the  




barangay (community of towns and villages) level a blend 
of informal and formal dispute resolution is evident. 
Using Cameroon as a case study, this paper seeks to 
examine if viable legal systems primarily built upon 
indigenous law and indigenous legal and quasi-legal 
notions could have developed in Africa with the potential 
of serving modern economic, political, and social reality.   
A former British and French colony, Cameroon became 
independent in 1961. Prior to becoming a League of 
Nations mandate, and subsequently a United Nations 
trustee under the British and French, Cameroon was a 
German protectorate. Following its colonial history 
Cameroon inherited a pluralistic system of laws which 
remain applicable in the country despite the existence of 
Cameroonian customary law which preceded those 
transplanted laws. Since independence, modern 
(transplanted) laws have consistently replaced or 
eclipsed traditional laws in most African countries 
including Cameroon (Okafo, 2009; Okereafoezeke, 2002; 
Time, 2000). While village settings tend to adhere to 
traditional laws, the future of traditional law in light of 
treatment by the received laws in big towns and cities is 
increasingly questionable. Several factors account for this 
trend including the lack of progress in village settings as 
opposed to the visible technological and commercial 
advancements in the bigger settings, heterogeneity in the 
bigger locales, plurality of dialects and languages in the 
towns and cities as well as constant transiency. Giving 
these factors this study examines if traditional laws can 
address the ever changing and complex transactions and 
incidences that are prevalent in both domestic and 
international dealings. This paper finds relevance in that it 
focuses the debate on a country with pluralistic formal 
laws, and a dual official language, as well as a multitude 
of traditional laws, and multitudes of dialects. 
 
 
SETTING AND PROCEDURE  
 
This study was conducted in Cameroon. Several methodological 
techniques were employed. Following years of living in the country 
and several subsequent visits, numerous discussions were held 
with legal scholars, judges and barristers. As well, local village 
chiefs were engaged in discussions and the case notes of one of 
them were reviewed. The penal code and other treatises were 
scrutinized. Further, sitting in, and observing which cases were 
processed in court and how the cases were disposed of further 
enlightened the research.   
 
 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION IN CAMEROON IN BOTH 
INFORMAL AND FORMAL JUDICIAL SETTINGS 
 
Just as inadequacies are obvious with formal systems of 
justice, so are inadequacies evident in indigenous 
systems of law. The Indigenous system of dispute 
resolution is characterized by an older male (usually the 
chief) in the community together with a few chosen 





involved) who rely on community mores and “wisdom” to 
persuade the litigants to set aside their differences. Even 
when women are included in the panel, their numbers are 
disproportionately small. In the Mwaku village of the 
Bakossi tribe in Cameroon for instance, the panel or 
traditional council comprises eighteen people, ten men, 
four women and four youths, and they meet every 
Sunday with the chief presiding over every deliberation 
(Time, 2000). The process of dispute resolution entails 
mediation with the intent of implementing a solution-
based outcome while still maintaining community 
harmony particularly since the litigants by and large do 
remain in the same community.   
As the only method of dispute resolution in 
Cameroonian villages and small towns, indigenous law is 
applied in all types of disputes including breach of 
contracts, matrimonial issues, land and tenancy disputes, 
property crimes, and assault and battery. Sanctions 
imposed by the chief and his panel include reprimands, 
giving livestock, palm wine, agricultural products, and 
even banishment. Litigants who are dissatisfied with 
outcomes in traditional forums of dispute resolutions have 
to take their cases to formal courts in big towns or cities 
where there will be trials de novo.   
Towns have customary courts and these courts are 
presided over by “notables” (Time, 2000).  Notables are 
ordinary citizens without any formal legal training who are 
presumed to be astute in folkways. They decide 
matrimonial cases, land and property disputes but defer 
child custody issues and alimony to high courts.   
Two formal systems of law exist in Cameroon due to 
the colonial heritage. Anglophone Cameroon has applied 
English law since colonization, and has continued to do 
so following a 1955 Magistrate Court Law.  Section 11 of 
the 1955 law states: 
 
Subject to the provision of any written law and in 
particular of this section and of section 10, 15, and 33 of 
this law, the common law the doctrines of equity, the 
statutes of general application which were in force in 
English on the first day of January 1900, shall in so far as 
they relate to any matter with respect to which the 
legislator of southern Cameroon is for the time being 
competent to make laws be in force within the jurisdiction 
of the court.   
 
Francophone Cameroon (8 out of ten regions/states in 
the country are French speaking) applies French law 
(code penal, code civil). Article 46 of legislation prevalent 
in what was Federal Republic of Cameroon stressed the 
need for the inherited laws to be retained as long as they 
did not conflict with the constitution.  Section 38 of the 
constitution of 1972 reinforced and added gravitas to 
Article 46 by stating: 
 
The legislation resulting from the laws and regulations 
applicable in the federal state of Cameroon and in the 





their provisions which are not contrary to the stipulations 
of this constitution shall remain in force, for as long as it 
is not amended by legislative or regulatory process 
(Constitution of the United Republic of Cameroon, 1972: 
22). Formal courts, which include courts of first instance, 




Could indigenous/traditional laws serve modern 
economic, political, and social realities?  
 
Cruz (2007: 3) notes that the terms “customary law, 
common law, indigenous law, tribal law, tradition, custom, 
norm, and primitive law” are used interchangeably to 
“refer to the law of indigenous peoples.” These customary 
laws are unwritten customs and mores passed down 
through oral tradition (Asiedu-Akrofi, 1989). Formal law in 
the context of African nations is usually Western law 
adopted by the various former colonies.   
Even though formal law has certain values and 
doctrines that are not evident in indigenous practices, as 
for instance, having set lex scripta of criminal procedure 
and evidence, established rule of law, and set laws/codes 
that regulate everyday transactions, and established 
ways of enforcements, a good number of local people still 
prefer traditional practices (Brillion, 1983; Austin, 1994, 
1995; Thompson, 1996; Time, 2000, 2011 (forthcoming); 
Okafo, 2009). This preference stems in part from apathy 
toward agents of the justice system, excessive delays in 
disposing cases, and over punitiveness of the justice 
system.  Further, preference for indigenous law may also 
be due to autochthonous people preferring “their own 
value system” (Cruz, 2007: 2).  
In Cameroon, there is no single customary practice. 
Each tribe has its own values and traditions which are 
invariably quite different. Because there are over a 
hundred tribes, and dialects, uniformity in practice is 
sometimes not obtainable. However, there is seldom 
tension in applying a custom since assessors from the 
tribes of each litigant are always present when there is a 
dispute.  Assessors interpret traditional practices, and 
when they are absent during a trial, any verdict rendered 
is null. For the most part, since everyday transactions 
and reasons for litigation in traditional settings mirror 
what goes on in the cities and in advanced countries, the 
efficacy of addressing these social and political realities 
cannot be challenged as long as the process reflects the 
practices and values of the society. Traditions and 
customs are not entirely static, like every process, 
customs adapt to contemporary occurrences. A jury in a 
western system of law decides a case using common 
sense while applying the law that governs the case. In 
like fashion, decisions of traditional rulers, notables and 
assessors are shaped by common sense and the 
applicable traditional value.   
With regard to breach of contractual obligations, 
modern courts in Cameroon apply the lex fori (law  of  the  




venue of the court) instead of the lex loci (law of the place 
where the contract was drawn). In essence, the place 
where the plaintiff files a law suit has jurisdiction of a 
case (Time, 2000). This is the case with indigenous 
practices as well, but by securing assessors from the 
various tribes of the litigants, indigenous methods of 
dispute resolution attempt to ensure equity by taking into 
consideration how each litigant perceived the contract. 
Most disputes everywhere arise because there is a 
breach of a contractual obligation of some sort, be it 
failure to perform a minor duty, or a failure to respect a 
more intricate obligation as for instance, an international 
treaty, trans-national trade agreement, or some private 
right and obligation. Malinowski (1926), who is one of the 
pioneers in this debate,  opines that both traditional and 
formal law strive for the same goal, and that is to address 
both the economic and social issues that arise between 
or among people. Consequently, even when approaches 
are different, the intent is similar. Decades later 
Gluckman (1955) noted that regardless of the locale, 
judges will enact similar laws to address similar issues. 
Giving that traditional councils play the functional roles of 
legislative, executive, and judiciary, it is not beyond their 
capacity to figure out how to address a novel issue.   
The argument could be made that it is easier to abide 
by formal law since its mandate is clearly written and 
published, unlike traditional law that requires that one 
immerses oneself in the tradition to understand the 
substantive and procedural aspects of the tradition. To 
this Benson (1990: 12) asserts that “customary law is 
recognized, not because it is backed by the power of 
some strong individual or institution, but because each 
individual recognizes the benefits of behaving with other 
individuals‟ expectations—given that others also behave 
as he expects”. 
Criticism has been levied on how traditional law 
addresses matrimonial issues (Time, 2000, 2012 
(forthcoming) cited in Time, 2011; Bentheim, 2010; 
Monekosso, 2001; Beswick, 2001; Erez and Thompson, 
1996). Power imbalances in the composition of the tribal 
council that decide cases (in the Bakossi tribe of 
Cameroon as discussed earlier, there are ten men and 
four women) in part accounts for the questionable, if not 
unconscionable, treatment of women in traditional courts, 
and not to be ignored, the rather backward mores and 
practices that continuously subjugate women.  
It is to be reckoned that schools are being opened in 
even very remote villages of Cameroon. It is only through 
education and self-empowerment that women get from 
activist groups and non-governmental organizations that 
change in how women are treated will be realized. In 
Mexico for instance, women‟s organizations have 
emerged with women advocating fairness and changes to 
traditional practices that are coercive, yet insisting to 
retain their traditional identities and values (Castillo, 
2002). Some of their demands have included “economic, 
political, physical, and socio-cultural autonomy” (Castillo,  




2002: 12). In Cameroon, even formal laws do not grant 
women the same human rights as men. As Ngassa 
(1999: 37) notes “…the law itself, lack of necessary laws 
…inability to enforce already enacted laws, the ability of 
society to assimilate and exploit new laws…”  hamper 
prospects of women in Cameroon from acquiring their 
human rights. 
Coercive treatment of women is not unique to 
traditional law or to a developing society like Cameroon. 
Belknap (2007); Bui (2007); Burford and Adams (2004); 
Hotaling and Buzawa (2003), have documented how 
battered women are rendered powerless in the U.S. 
justice system, either by reducing their role in the judicial 
process to a “passive” one, or by not providing them 
adequate protection thereby compromising their safety. It 
is for these reasons as van Wormer (2004); Gilligan 
(1982), suggest that many western countries are turning 
to informal methods to resolve matrimonial issues. 
Informal methods here refer to a conferencing method, 
but then for this to have integrity it should be gender 
neutral. 
Acquired or transplanted law reflects the values and 
mores of the society from which the law is borrowed. The 
value system of that society is inculcated into its citizens 
from early on in life, and as Cruz (2007: 2) states, “an 
indigenous nation‟s sovereignty is strengthened if its law 
is based upon its own internalized values and norms.” 
Transplanted law therefore does not re-enforce the 
values of the receiving nation, consequently using that 
law to regulate the behavior of people is anomalous.  Law 
addresses social situations that arise among persons of 
that culture, or persons in that culture, and the fact that 
the law may not be codified, or is not reflective of the 
ideals of another society does not lessen its ability to 
control the social processes of those under its sphere.   
English and French are the national languages of 
Cameroon, and just a small fraction of the population is 
fluent in either, let alone both. The applicable laws in the 
formal courts are borrowed in their entirety from England 
and France, and only piecemeal attempts have been 
made to promulgate laws that depart from the colonial 
precepts (Time, 2000). Since there are as many dialects 
in the country as there are tribes, whose dialect gets 
precedence when there is a dispute is an obstacle that 
cannot be ignored given that it is impossible to expect 
anyone to know the hundreds of dialects in the country. 
Should the indigenous laws be codified in English and 
French? Cruz (2007) discussed this predicament in 
relation to Pueblos. She reflectively states that “When a 
tribe works its Indian tradition into any non-traditional 
system, the outcome represents a mixture, not pure 
tradition” (Cruz, 2007: 6). Formal courts are not free of 
the language dilemma that occasionally crop up in 
traditional settings. To use language/dialect barrier 
therefore to cast doubt as to the ability of a country to use 
its traditional ways to resolve disputes, be they those that 





may be casting doubt as to the foundational principles of 
customs.    
 
 
Difficulties in using indigenous laws to serve modern 
economic, social, and political realities 
 
That traditional law can be adopted to handle 
contemporary social, political, and economic realities is 
not as easy as may appear. Cruz (2007: 8) lists a number 
of pertinent questions that need to be properly addressed 
if indigenous laws can be the law of the land.  Among the 
questions are:  
 
 … What traditional law are we talking about? … How is 
traditional law organized? Are there some aspects of 
traditional law that are inappropriate for discussion? How 
should elders be selected? Who is an elder? In what 
manner should meetings and interviews be conducted? 
Who should be involved in the work and who should 
make decisions regarding the interpretation of materials 
gathered? Can the meaning of the law survive the 
translation from the native language to written English? 
Should it be translated or kept in the native language?  
Who holds the law? Who is to say what traditional law 
applies or translates to this modern time?  
As Cruz acknowledges these are in fact very difficult 
questions, and responses to them depend on several 
factors including: the history of each tribe, the level of 
assimilation of colonial influences, the influence of inter 
tribal marriages, as well as how much of the dialects, 
land, and folkways have been retained. Further, giving 
that local chiefs, particularly those in many African states, 
rule their tribes as dictatorships as their rulings are not 
subject to challenges nor are there any mechanisms of 
accountability or transparency, it is difficult to fathom the 
extent to which indigenous laws can serve broad modern 
interests.  
In the context of Cameroon, having indigenous law as 
law of the land and the law that applies in dealings with 
other countries may be an uphill task. Currently, some 
tribes (for example, Douala, Bamileke, Bassa, Ewondo, 
Hausa, Bali, and a few others) are more than hundreds 
more either in fact, or seemingly, more dominant and 
strive for more national recognition as the pre-eminent 
tribe.   Should one tribal law be projected as the national 
law if Cameroon ever considered dispensing with western 
law there likely will be more putrefaction and more 
dividedness. As a bi-jural country, strife is evident as 
common law is increasingly being suppressed. Take the 
CIMA CODE, for instance, a French acronym for 
Conference InterAfricain de Marche d’assurance en 
Abrege, which embodies laws that deal with insurance 
issues, it completely ignores common law (Time, 2000). 
As well, as a signatory to a 1996 treaty that blends civil 
and commercial laws in sixteen Francophone African 





and completely disregards common law and English. If 
Anglophone Cameroon is already crying foul and 
contemplating seceding, it is hard to imagine the chaos 
that will ensue if one tribe‟s laws were chosen as law of 
the land.   
As Pimentel (2010) notes, independence from colonial 
rule comes with a price for most African nations. To be 
part of the community of nations, and a member of the 
United Nations, Pimentel (2010) observes that African 
countries invariably have to conform to western law. 
Further, he remarks that because African countries rely 
on the World Bank, the International Monetary Fund, and 
other countries for their economic growth, they are almost 
fated to embrace western systems of law especially since 
these organizations and countries usually stipulate the 
legal system that best projects their interests. Such also 
is the case when western countries, in promoting human 
rights and justice, define what justice is and stipulate the 
process by which justice is attained.   
Okafo (2009: 231) maintains that left to their own 
devices Africans and indeed former colonies can 
maintain indigenous laws that best serve their needs. He 
states “colonization breeds criminalization. This is 
because a colonizer needs coercive rules and 
regulations, usually with excessive penalties attached, to 
obtain compliance with the colonizer‟s policies, which 
invariably are out-of-sync and thus unpopular among the 
colonized.” The point is well taken except that if countries 
like Cameroon have to continuously rely on foreign aid for 
sustenance, and can never seem to be able to account 
for the aid or loan money, then the donor or lender should 
dictate a process of accountability even if it means 
imposing their own system of justice (BBC surmised that  
“tackling AIDS cannot happen until a cure is found for 
Cameroon‟s second deadly virus—corruption” (Cuffe, J. 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/africa/6198337.stm, retrieved 
1/6/2007)). BBC proffered this statement after doubts 
were raised as to whether Cameroon could account for 
the $133 million (68 million pounds) given to help 
HIV/AIDS patients. These doubts were raised given a 
history of graft and extensive mismanagement of funds in 




      
A country‟s heritage and identity are marked by the 
values and norms with which it has evolved.  After all, the 
sovereignty of a nation and its tradition can only be 
fortified if its laws are premised upon the values and 
norms it adopted from its inception. When borrowed law 
is made the dominant applicable law in a country, it 
signals that the values of the lender country are also 
imported. To legitimize and enforce such laws, the people 
upon whom they are imposed must readily be receptive 
of them otherwise a constant clash will ensue. That said, 
there  is  nothing   to   suggest   that   the   prevalence   of  




indigenous laws per se leads to law abidance or to easy 
law enforcement.   
This discussion will have little significance if indigenous 
laws were advocated just for those under its influence.  
However, the thesis rests upon whether indigenous laws 
can be used to address modern social, economic, and 
political realities. Giving that many African nations 
depend on the United Nations and other organizations for 
intervention during crisis, and these organizations are 
also restraining forces for human rights violations, there 
is thus a limit to what indigenous laws can control.  
Moreover, when a country constantly depends on others 
for economic viability, that country accepts not only the 
terms of the aid, but also the rule of law projected by the 
donor to secure its interest.  What is ultimately drawn 
from this discussion and advocated is a process whereby 
indigenous laws and formal laws coexist with each 
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